In this paper we review criteria and methods for short-term reliability assessment and provision underlying current industry practices. The basic conclusion is that these approaches do not directly provide quality of service requested by the regulators on behalf of the consumers. Reasons for this situation are complex, and are results of both regulatory and technical limitations. In this paper we use simple examples to illustrate rationale for this claim and its implications. Particular stress is on the criteria (standards) and tools used by a system operator. We illustrate on a small example what one can and cannot expect from specific approaches.
In the later part of this paper we suggest possible changes in the paradigms between the provider(s) of reliable service and its users. Under this new paradigm the reliability responsibilities are clearly decomposed into reliability provision by suppliers and wire companies, with understanding of verifiable reliability-related products seen by the customer. We furthermore conjecture that this framework can only be implemented in a regulatory setup that nurtures performance incentives in one form or the other.