

The  
Future of  
Nuclear  
Power

AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY

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ISBN 0-615-12420-8

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
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# Forward and Acknowledgments


We decided to study the future of nuclear power because we believe this technology, despite the challenges it faces, is an important option for the United States and the world to meet future energy needs without emitting carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) and other atmospheric pollutants. Other options include increased efficiency, renewables, and sequestration. We believe that all options should be preserved as nations develop strategies that provide energy while meeting important environmental challenges. The nuclear power option will only be exercised, however, if the technology demonstrates better economics, improved safety, successful waste management, and low proliferation risk, and if public policies place a significant value on electricity production that does not produce CO<sub>2</sub>. Our study identifies the issues facing nuclear power and what might be done to overcome them.

Our audience is government, industry, and academic leaders with an interest in the management of the interrelated set of technical, eco-

nomic, environmental, and political issues that must be addressed if large-scale deployment of new nuclear power generating facilities is to remain an option for providing a significant fraction of electricity supply in the middle of this century. We trust that our analysis and arguments will stimulate constructive dialogue about the way forward.

This study also reflects our conviction that the MIT community is well equipped to carry out interdisciplinary studies intended to shed light on complex socio-technical issues that will have a major impact on our economy and society. Nuclear power is but one example; we hope to encourage and participate in future studies with a similar purpose.

We acknowledge generous financial support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and from MIT's Office of the Provost and Laboratory for Energy and the Environment.





# Executive Summary

## STUDY CONTEXT

Over the next 50 years, unless patterns change dramatically, energy production and use will contribute to global warming through large-scale greenhouse gas emissions — hundreds of billions of tonnes of carbon in the form of carbon dioxide. Nuclear power could be one option for reducing carbon emissions. At present, however, this is unlikely: nuclear power faces stagnation and decline.

This study analyzes what would be required to retain nuclear power as a significant option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and meeting growing needs for electricity supply. Our analysis is guided by a global growth scenario that would expand current worldwide nuclear generating capacity almost threefold, to 1000 billion watts, by the year 2050. Such a deployment would avoid 1.8 billion tonnes of carbon emissions annually from coal plants, about 25% of the increment in carbon emissions otherwise expected in a business-as-usual scenario. This study also recommends changes in government policy and industrial practice needed in the relatively near term to retain an option for such an outcome.

We did not analyze other options for reducing carbon emissions — renewable energy sources, carbon sequestration, and increased energy efficiency — and therefore reach no conclusions about priorities among these efforts and nuclear power. In our judgment, it would be a mistake to exclude any of these four options at this time.

## STUDY FINDINGS

For a large expansion of nuclear power to succeed, four critical problems must be overcome:

- **Cost.** In deregulated markets, nuclear power is not now cost competitive with coal and natural gas. However, plausible reductions by industry in capital cost, operation and maintenance costs, and construction time could reduce the gap. Carbon emission credits, if enacted by government, can give nuclear power a cost advantage.
- **Safety.** Modern reactor designs can achieve a very low risk of serious accidents, but “best practices” in construction and operation are essential. We know little about the safety of the overall fuel cycle, beyond reactor operation.
- **Waste.** Geological disposal is technically feasible but execution is yet to be demonstrated or certain. A convincing case has not been made that the long-term waste management benefits of advanced, closed fuel cycles involving reprocessing of spent fuel are outweighed by the short-term risks and costs. Improvement in the open, once through fuel cycle may offer waste management benefits as large as those claimed for the more expensive closed fuel cycles.
- **Proliferation.** The current international safeguards regime is inadequate to meet the security challenges of the expanded nuclear deployment contemplated in the global growth scenario. The reprocessing system now used in Europe, Japan, and Russia that involves separation and recycling of plutonium presents unwarranted proliferation risks.

**We conclude that, over at least the next 50 years, the best choice to meet these challenges is the open, once-through fuel cycle.** We judge that there are adequate uranium resources available at reasonable cost to support this choice under a global growth scenario.

Public acceptance will also be critical to expansion of nuclear power. Our survey results show that the public does not yet see nuclear power as a way to address global warming, suggesting that further public education may be necessary.

### SELECTED RECOMMENDATIONS

- We support the Department of Energy (DOE) 2010 initiative to reduce costs through new design certification, site banking, and combined construction and operation licenses.
- The government should also share “first mover” costs for a limited number of power plants that represent safety-enhancing evolutionary reactor design. We propose a production tax credit for up to \$200/kWe of the plant’s construction cost. This mechanism creates a strong incentive to complete and operate the plant and the mechanism is extendable to other carbon-free technologies. The government actions we recommend aim to challenge the industry to demonstrate the cost reductions claimed for new reactor construction, with industry assuming the risks and benefits beyond first- mover costs.
- Federal or state portfolio standards should include incremental nuclear power capacity as a carbon free source.
- The DOE should broaden its long-term waste R&D program, to include improved engineered barriers, investigation of alternative geological environments, and deep bore hole disposal. A system of central facilities to store spent fuel for many decades prior to geologic disposal should be an integral part of the waste management strategy. The U.S. should encourage greater harmonization of international standards and regulations for waste transportation, storage, and disposal.
- The International Atomic Energy Agency should have authority to inspect all suspect facilities (implement the Additional Protocol) and should develop a worldwide system for materials protection, control, and accountability that goes beyond accounting, reporting, and periodic inspections. The U.S. should monitor and influence developments in a broad range of enrichment technologies.
- The DOE R&D program should be realigned to focus on the open, once-through fuel cycle. It should also conduct an international uranium resource assessment; establish a large *nuclear system analysis, modeling, and simulation project*, including collection of engineering data, to assess alternative nuclear fuel cycle deployments relative to the four critical challenges; and halt development and demonstration of advanced fuel cycles or reactors until the results of the nuclear system analysis project are available.

# CHAPTER 1 — THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER — OVERVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

The generation of electricity from fossil fuels, notably natural gas and coal, is a major and growing contributor to the emission of carbon dioxide – a greenhouse gas that contributes significantly to global warming. We share the scientific consensus that these emissions must be reduced and believe that the U.S. will eventually join with other nations in the effort to do so.

At least for the next few decades, there are only a few realistic options for reducing carbon dioxide emissions from electricity generation:

- ▣ increase efficiency in electricity generation and use;
- ▣ expand use of renewable energy sources such as wind, solar, biomass, and geothermal;
- ▣ capture carbon dioxide emissions at fossil-fueled (especially coal) electric generating plants and permanently sequester the carbon; and
- ▣ increase use of nuclear power.

The goal of this interdisciplinary MIT study is not to predict which of these options will prevail or to argue for their comparative advantages. In *our view, it is likely that we shall need all of these options and accordingly it would be a mistake at this time to exclude any of these four options from an overall carbon emissions management strategy*. Rather we seek to explore and evaluate actions that could be taken to maintain nuclear power as one of the significant options for meeting future world energy needs at low cost and in an environmentally acceptable manner.

*In our view, it would be a mistake at this time to exclude any of these four options from an overall carbon emissions management strategy.*

In 2002, nuclear power supplied 20% of United States and 17% of world electricity consumption. Experts project worldwide electricity consumption will increase substantially in the coming decades, especially in the developing world, accompanying economic growth and social progress. However, official forecasts call for a mere 5% increase in nuclear electricity generating capacity worldwide by 2020 (and even this is questionable), while electricity use could grow by as

much as 75%. These projections entail little new nuclear plant construction and reflect both economic considerations and growing anti-nuclear sentiment in key countries. The limited prospects for nuclear power today are attributable, ultimately, to four unresolved problems:

- ❑ *Costs: nuclear power has higher overall lifetime costs* compared to natural gas with combined cycle turbine technology (CCGT) and coal, at least in the absence of a carbon tax or an equivalent “cap and trade” mechanism for reducing carbon emissions;
- ❑ *Safety: nuclear power has perceived adverse safety, environmental, and health effects*, heightened by the 1979 Three Mile Island and 1986 Chernobyl reactor accidents, but also by accidents at fuel cycle facilities in the United States, Russia, and Japan. There is also growing concern about the safe and secure transportation of nuclear materials and the security of nuclear facilities from terrorist attack;
- ❑ *Proliferation: nuclear power entails potential security risks*, notably the possible misuse of commercial or associated nuclear facilities and operations to acquire technology or materials as a precursor to the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. Fuel cycles that involve the chemical reprocessing of spent fuel to separate weapons-usable plutonium and uranium enrichment technologies are of special concern, especially as nuclear power spreads around the world;
- ❑ *Waste: nuclear power has unresolved challenges in long-term management of radioactive wastes*. The United States and other countries have yet to implement final disposition of spent fuel or high level radioactive waste streams created at various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Since these radioactive wastes present some danger to present and future generations, the public and its elected representatives, as well as prospective investors in nuclear power plants, properly expect continuing and substantial progress towards solution to the waste disposal problem. Successful operation of the planned disposal facility at Yucca Mountain would ease, but not solve, the waste issue for the U.S. and other countries if nuclear power expands substantially.

*We believe the nuclear option should be retained, precisely because it is an important carbon-free source of power.*

Today, nuclear power is not an economically competitive choice. Moreover, unlike other energy technologies, nuclear power requires significant government involvement because of safety, proliferation, and waste concerns. If in the future carbon dioxide emissions carry a significant “price,” however, nuclear energy could be an important — indeed vital — option for generating electricity. We do not know whether this will occur. But *we believe the nuclear option should be retained, precisely because it is an important carbon-free source of power that can potentially make a significant contribution to future electricity supply.*

To preserve the nuclear option for the future requires overcoming the four challenges described above—costs, safety, proliferation, and wastes. These challenges will escalate if a significant number of new nuclear generating plants are built in a growing number of countries. The effort to overcome these challenges, however, is justified only if nuclear power can potentially contribute significantly to reducing global warming, which entails major expansion of nuclear power. In effect, preserving the nuclear option for the future means planning for growth, as well as for a future in which nuclear energy is a competitive, safer, and more secure source of power.

To explore these issues, our study postulates a *global growth scenario* that by mid-century would see 1000 to 1500 reactors of 1000 megawatt-electric (MWe) capacity each deployed worldwide, compared to a capacity equivalent to 366 such reactors now in service. Nuclear power expansion on this scale requires U.S. leadership, continued commitment by Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, a renewal of European activity, and wider deployment of nuclear power around the world. An illustrative deployment of 1000 reactors, each 1000 MWe in size, under this scenario is given in following table.

This scenario would displace a significant amount of carbon-emitting fossil fuel generation. In 2002, carbon equivalent emission from human activity was about 6,500 million tonnes per year; these emissions will probably more than double by 2050. The 1000 GWe of nuclear power postulated here would avoid annually about 800 million tonnes of carbon equivalent if the electricity generation displaced was gas-fired and 1,800 million tonnes if the generation was coal-fired, assuming no capture and sequestration of carbon dioxide from combustion sources.

Global Growth Scenario			
REGION	PROJECTED 2050 GWe CAPACITY	NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY MARKET SHARE	
		2000	2050
<b>Total World</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>19%</b>
Developed world	625	23%	29%
U.S.	300		
Europe & Canada	210		
Developed East Asia	115		
FSU	50	16%	23%
Developing world	325	2%	11%
China, India, Pakistan	200		
Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico	75		
Other developing countries	50		

Projected capacity comes from the global electricity demand scenario in Appendix 2, which entails growth in global electricity consumption from 13.6 to 38.7 trillion kWhrs from 2000 to 2050 (2.1% annual growth). The market share in 2050 is predicated on 85% capacity factor for nuclear power reactors. Note that China, India, and Pakistan are nuclear weapons capable states. Other developing countries includes as leading contributors Iran, South Africa, Egypt, Thailand, Philippines, and Vietnam.

## FUEL CYCLE CHOICES

A critical factor for the future of an expanded nuclear power industry is the choice of the fuel cycle — what type of fuel is used, what types of reactors “burn” the fuel, and the method of disposal of the spent fuel. This choice affects all four key problems that confront nuclear power — costs, safety, proliferation risk, and waste disposal. For this study, we examined three representative nuclear fuel cycle deployments:

*We believe that the world-wide supply of uranium ore is sufficient to fuel the deployment of 1,000 reactors over the next half century.*

▣ *conventional thermal reactors operating in a “once-through” mode*, in which discharged spent fuel is sent directly to disposal;

▣ *thermal reactors with reprocessing in a “closed” fuel cycle*, which means that waste products are separated from unused fissionable material that is re-cycled as fuel into reactors. This includes the fuel cycle currently used in some countries in which plutonium is separated from spent fuel, fabricated into a mixed plutonium and uranium oxide fuel, and recycled to reactors for one pass<sup>1</sup>;

▣ *fast reactors<sup>2</sup> with reprocessing in a balanced “closed” fuel cycle*, which means thermal reactors operated world-wide in “once-through” mode and a balanced number of fast reactors that destroy the actinides separated from thermal reactor spent fuel. The fast reactors, reprocessing, and fuel fabrication facilities would be co-located in secure nuclear energy “parks” in industrial countries.

Closed fuel cycles extend fuel supplies. The viability of the once-through alternative in a global growth scenario depends upon the amount of uranium resource that is available at economically attractive prices. *We believe that the world-wide supply of uranium ore is sufficient to fuel the deployment of 1000 reactors over the next half century* and to maintain this level of deployment over a 40 year lifetime of this fleet. This is an important foundation of our study, based upon currently available information and the history of natural resource supply.

The result of our detailed analysis of the relative merits of these representative fuel cycles with respect to key evaluation criteria can be summarized as follows: *The once through cycle has advantages in cost, proliferation, and fuel cycle safety*, and is disadvantageous only in respect to long-term waste disposal; the

1. This fuel cycle is known as Plutonium Recycle Mixed Oxide, or PUREX/MOX.

2. A fast reactor more readily breeds fissionable isotopes-potential fuel-because it utilizes higher energy neutrons that in turn create more neutrons when absorbed by fertile elements, e.g. fissile Pu<sup>239</sup> is bred from neutron absorption of U<sup>238</sup> followed by beta (electron) emission from the nucleus.

two closed cycles have clear advantages only in long-term aspects of waste disposal, and disadvantages in cost, short-term waste issues, proliferation risk, and fuel cycle safety. (See Table.) Cost and waste criteria are likely to be the most crucial for determining nuclear power's future.

We have not found, and based on current knowledge do not believe it is realistic to expect, that there are new reactor and fuel cycle technologies that simultaneously overcome the problems of cost, safety, waste, and proliferation.

Our analysis leads to a significant conclusion: *The once-through fuel cycle best meets the criteria of low costs and proliferation resistance.* Closed fuel cycles may have an advantage from the point of view of long-term waste disposal and, if it ever becomes relevant, resource extension. But closed fuel cycles will be more expensive than once-through cycles, until ore resources become very scarce. This is unlikely to happen, even with significant growth in nuclear power, until at least the second half of this century, and probably considerably later still. Thus our most important recommendation is:

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***For the next decades, government and industry in the U.S. and elsewhere should give priority to the deployment of the once-through fuel cycle, rather than the development of more expensive closed fuel cycle technology involving reprocessing and new advanced thermal or fast reactor technologies.***

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This recommendation implies a major re-ordering of priorities of the U.S. Department of Energy nuclear R&D programs.

Fuel Cycle Types and Ratings					
	ECONOMICS	WASTE	PROLIFERATION	SAFETY	
				Reactor	Fuel Cycle
Once through	+	× short term – long term	+	×	+
Closed thermal	–	– short term + long term	–	×	–
Closed fast	–	– short term + long term	–	<b>+ to –</b>	–

+ means relatively advantageous; × means relatively neutral; – means relatively disadvantageous

This table indicates broadly the relative advantage and disadvantage among the different type of nuclear fuel cycles. It does not indicate relative standing with respect to other electricity-generating technologies, where the criteria might be quite different (for example, the nonproliferation criterion applies only to nuclear).

## PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR POWER

Expanded deployment of nuclear power requires public acceptance of this energy source. Our review of survey results shows that a majority of Americans and Europeans oppose building new nuclear power plants to meet future energy needs. To understand why, we surveyed 1350 adults in the US about their attitudes toward energy in general and nuclear power in particular. Three important and unexpected results emerged from that survey:

- The U.S. public's attitudes are informed almost entirely by their perceptions of the technology, rather than by politics or by demographics such as income, education, and gender.
- The U.S. public's views on nuclear waste, safety, and costs are critical to their judgments about the future deployment of this technology. Technological improvements that lower costs and improve safety and waste problems can increase public support substantially.
- In the United States, people do not connect concern about global warming with carbon-free nuclear power. There is no difference in support for building more nuclear power plants between those who are very concerned about global warming and those who are not. Public education may help improve understanding about the link between global warming, fossil fuel usage, and the need for low-carbon energy sources.

There are two implications of these findings for our study: first, the U.S. public is unlikely to support nuclear power expansion without substantial improvements in costs and technology. Second, the carbon-free character of nuclear power, the major motivation for our study, does not appear to motivate the U.S. general public to prefer expansion of the nuclear option.

*The U.S. public is unlikely to support nuclear power expansion without substantial improvements in costs and technology.*



## ECONOMICS

Nuclear power will succeed in the long run only if it has a lower cost than competing technologies. This is especially true as electricity markets become progressively less subject to economic regulation in many parts of the world. We constructed a model to evaluate the real cost of electricity from nuclear power versus pulverized coal plants and natural gas combined cycle plants (at various projected levels of real lifetime prices for natural gas), over their economic lives. These technologies are most widely used today and, absent a carbon tax or its equivalent, are less expensive than many renewable technologies. Our “merchant” cost model uses assumptions that commercial investors would be expected to use today, with parameters based on actual experience rather than engineering estimates of what might be achieved under ideal conditions; it compares the constant or “levelized” price of electricity over the life of a power plant that would be necessary to cover all operating expenses and taxes and provide an acceptable return to investors. The comparative figures given below assume 85% capacity factor and a 40-year economic life for the nuclear plant, reflect economic conditions in the U.S, and consider a range of projected improvements in nuclear cost factors. (See Table.)

Comparative Power Costs	
CASE (Year 2002 \$)	REAL LEVELIZED COST Cents/kWe-hr
Nuclear (LWR)	6.7
+ Reduce construction cost 25%	5.5
+ Reduce construction time 5 to 4 years	5.3
+ Further reduce O&M to 13 mills/kWe-hr	5.1
+ Reduce cost of capital to gas/coal	4.2
Pulverized Coal	4.2
CCGT <sup>a</sup> (low gas prices, \$3.77/MCF)	3.8
CCGT (moderate gas prices, \$4.42/MCF)	4.1
CCGT (high gas prices, \$6.72/MCF)	5.6

a. Gas costs reflect real, levelized acquisition cost per thousand cubic feet (MCF) over the economic life of the project.

We judge the indicated cost improvements for nuclear power to be plausible, but not proven. The model results make clear why electricity produced from new nuclear power plants today is not competitive with electricity produced from coal or natural gas-fueled CCGT plants with low or moderate gas prices, unless *all* cost improvements for nuclear power are realized. The cost comparison becomes worse for nuclear if the capacity factor falls. It is also important to emphasize that the nuclear cost structure is driven by high up-front capital costs, while the natural gas cost driver is the fuel cost; coal lies in between nuclear and natural gas with respect to both fuel and capital costs.

Nuclear does become more competitive by comparison if the social cost of carbon emissions is internalized, for example through a carbon tax or an equivalent “cap and trade” system. Under the assumption that the costs of carbon emissions are imposed, the accompanying table illustrates the impact on the competitive costs for different power sources, for emission costs in the range of \$50 to \$200/tonne carbon. (See Table.) The ultimate cost will depend on both societal choices (such as how much carbon dioxide emission

Power Costs with Carbon Taxes			
CARBON TAX CASES LEVELIZED ELECTRICITY COST cents/kWe-hr			
	\$50/tonne C	\$100/tonne C	\$200/tonne C
Coal	5.4	6.6	9.0
Gas (low)	4.3	4.8	5.9
Gas (moderate)	4.7	5.2	6.2
Gas (high)	6.1	6.7	7.7

to permit) and technology developments, such as the cost and feasibility of large-scale carbon capture and long-term sequestration. Clearly, costs in the range of \$100 to \$200/tonne C would significantly affect the relative cost competitiveness of coal, natural gas, and nuclear electricity generation.

The carbon-free nature of nuclear power argues for government action to encourage maintenance of the nuclear option, particularly in light of the regulatory uncertainties facing the use of nuclear power and the unwillingness of investors to bear the risk of introducing a new generation of nuclear facilities with their high capital costs.

We recommend three actions to improve the economic viability of nuclear power:

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***The government should cost share for site banking for a number of plants, certification of new plant designs by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and combined construction and operating licenses for plants built immediately or in the future; we support U.S. Department of Energy initiatives on these subjects.***

***The government should recognize nuclear as carbon-free and include new nuclear plants as an eligible option in any federal or state mandatory renewable energy portfolio (i.e., a “carbon-free” portfolio) standard.***

***The government should provide a modest subsidy for a small set of “first mover” commercial nuclear plants to demonstrate cost and regulatory feasibility in the form of a production tax credit.***

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We propose a production tax credit of up to \$200 per kWe of the construction cost of up to 10 “first mover” plants. This benefit might be paid out at about 1.7 cents per kWe-hr, over a year and a half of full-power plant operation. We prefer the production tax credit mechanism because it offers the greatest incentive for projects to be completed and because it can be extended to other carbon free electricity technologies, for example renewables, (wind currently enjoys a 1.7 cents per kWe-hr tax credit for ten years) and coal with carbon capture and sequestration. The credit of 1.7 cents per kWe- hr is equivalent to a credit of \$70 per avoided metric ton of carbon if the electricity were to have come from coal plants (or \$160 from natural gas plants). Of course, the carbon emission reduction would then continue without public assistance for the plant life (perhaps 60 years for nuclear). If no new nuclear plant is built, the government will not pay a subsidy.

These actions will be effective in stimulating additional investment in nuclear generating capacity if, and only if, the industry can live up to its own expectations of being able to reduce considerably capital costs for new plants.

Advanced fuel cycles add considerably to the cost of nuclear electricity. We considered reprocessing and one-pass fuel recycle with current technology, and found the fuel cost, including waste storage and disposal charges, to be about 4.5 times the fuel cost of the once-through cycle. Thus use of advanced fuel cycles imposes a significant economic penalty on nuclear power.

## SAFETY

We believe the safety standard for the global growth scenario should maintain today's standard of less than one serious release of radioactivity accident for 50 years from all fuel cycle activity. This standard implies a ten-fold reduction in the expected frequency of serious reactor core accidents, from  $10^{-4}$ /reactor year to  $10^{-5}$ /reactor year. This reactor safety standard should be possible to achieve in new light water reactor plants that make use of advanced safety designs. International adherence to such a standard is important, because an accident in any country will influence public attitudes everywhere. The extent to which nuclear facilities should be hardened to possible terrorist attack has yet to be resolved.

We do not believe there is a nuclear plant design that is totally risk free. In part, this is due to technical possibilities; in part due to workforce issues. Safe operation requires effective regulation, a management committed to safety, and a skilled work force.

The high temperature gas-cooled reactor is an interesting candidate for reactor research and development because there is already some experience with this system, although not all of it is favorable. This reactor design offers safety advantages because the high heat capacity of the core and fuel offers longer response times and precludes excessive temperatures that might lead to release of fission products; it also has an advantage compared to light water reactors in terms of proliferation resistance.

*These actions will be effective in stimulating additional investment in nuclear generating capacity if, and only if, the industry can live up to its own expectations of being able to reduce considerably overnight capital costs for new plants.*

Because of the accidents at Three Mile Island in 1979 and Chernobyl in 1986, a great deal of attention has focused on reactor safety. However, the safety record of reprocessing plants is not good, and there has been little safety analysis of fuel cycle facilities using, for example, the probabilistic risk assessment method. More work is needed here.

Our principal recommendation on safety is:

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***The government should, as part of its near-term R&D program, develop more fully the capabilities to analyze life-cycle health and safety impacts of fuel cycle facilities and focus reactor development on options that can achieve enhanced safety standards and are deployable within a couple of decades.***

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## WASTE MANAGEMENT

The management and disposal of high-level radioactive spent fuel from the nuclear fuel cycle is one of the most intractable problems facing the nuclear power industry throughout the world. No country has yet successfully implemented a system for disposing of this waste. We concur with the many independent expert reviews that have concluded that geologic repositories will be capable of safely isolating the waste from the biosphere. However, implementation of this method is a highly demanding task that will place great stress on operating, regulatory, and political institutions.

*We do not believe a convincing case can be made, on the basis of waste management considerations alone, that the benefits of advanced, closed fuel cycles will outweigh the attendant safety, environmental, and security risks and economic costs.*

For fifteen years the U.S. high-level waste management program has focused almost exclusively on the proposed repository site at Yucca Mountain in Nevada. Although the successful commissioning of the Yucca Mountain repository would be a significant step towards the secure disposal of nuclear waste, we believe that a broader, strategically balanced nuclear waste program is needed to prepare the way for a possible major expansion of the nuclear power sector in the U.S. and overseas.

The global growth scenario, based on the once-through fuel cycle, would require multiple disposal facilities by the year 2050. To dispose of the spent fuel from a steady state deployment of one thousand 1 GWe reactors of the light water type, new repository capacity equal to the nominal storage capacity of Yucca Mountain would have to be created somewhere in the world every three to four years. This requirement, along with the desire to reduce long-term risks from the waste, prompts interest in advanced, closed fuel cycles.

These schemes would separate or partition plutonium and other actinides — and possibly certain fission products — from the spent fuel and transmute them into shorter-lived and more benign species. The goals would be to reduce the thermal load from radioactive decay of the waste on the repository, thereby increasing its storage capacity, and to shorten the time for which the waste must be isolated from the biosphere.

We have analyzed the waste management implications of both once-through and closed fuel cycles, taking into account each stage of the fuel cycle and the risks of radiation exposure in both the short and long-term. *We do not believe that a convincing case can be made on the basis of waste management considerations alone that the benefits of partitioning and transmutation will outweigh the attendant safety, environmental, and security risks and economic costs.* Future technology developments could change the balance of expected costs, risks, and benefits. For our fundamental conclusion to change, however, not only would the expected long term risks from geologic repositories have to be significantly higher than those indicated in current assessments, but the incremental costs and short-term safety and environmental risks would have to be greatly reduced relative to current expectations and experience.

We further conclude that waste management strategies in the once-through fuel cycle are potentially available that could yield long-term risk reductions at least as great as those claimed for waste partitioning and transmutation, with fewer short-term risks and lower development and deployment costs. These include both incremental improvements to the current mainstream mined repositories approach and more far-reaching innovations such as deep borehole disposal. Finally, replacing the current ad hoc approach to spent fuel storage at reactor sites with an explicit strategy to store spent fuel for a period of several decades will create additional flexibility in the waste management system.

Our principal recommendations on waste management are:

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***The DOE should augment its current focus on Yucca Mountain with a balanced long-term waste management R&D program.***

***A research program should be launched to determine the viability of geologic disposal in deep boreholes within a decade.***

***A network of centralized facilities for storing spent fuel for several decades should be established in the U.S. and internationally.***

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## NONPROLIFERATION

Nuclear power should not expand unless the risk of proliferation from operation of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle is made acceptably small. We believe that nuclear power can expand as envisioned in our global growth scenario with acceptable incremental proliferation risk, provided that reasonable safeguards are adopted and that deployment of reprocessing and enrichment are restricted. The international community must prevent the acquisition of weapons-usable material, either by diversion (in the case of plutonium) or by misuse of fuel cycle facilities (including related facilities, such as research reactors or hot cells). Responsible governments must control, to the extent possible, the know-how relevant to produce and process either highly enriched uranium (enrichment technology) or plutonium.

*Nuclear power should not expand unless the risk of proliferation from operation of the commercial nuclear fuel cycle is made acceptably small.*

Three issues are of particular concern: existing stocks of *separated* plutonium around the world that are directly usable for weapons; nuclear facilities, for example in Russia, with inadequate controls; and transfer of technology, especially enrichment and reprocessing technology, that brings nations closer to a nuclear weapons capability. The proliferation risk of the global growth scenario is underlined by the likelihood that use of nuclear power would be introduced and expanded in many countries in different security circumstances.

An international response is required to reduce the proliferation risk. The response should:

- ▣ re-appraise and strengthen the institutional underpinnings of the IAEA safeguards regime in the near term, including sanctions;
- ▣ guide nuclear fuel cycle development in ways that reinforce shared nonproliferation objectives.

Accordingly, we recommend:

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***The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should focus overwhelmingly on its safeguards function and should be given the authority to carry out inspections beyond declared facilities to suspected illicit facilities;***

***Greater attention must be given to the proliferation risks at the front end of the fuel cycle from enrichment technologies;***

***IAEA safeguards should move to an approach based on continuous materials protection, control and accounting using surveillance and containment systems, both in facilities and during transportation, and should implement safeguards in a risk-based framework keyed to fuel cycle activity;***

***Fuel cycle analysis, research, development, and demonstration efforts must include explicit analysis of proliferation risks and measures defined to minimize proliferation risks;***

***International spent fuel storage has significant nonproliferation benefits for the growth scenario and should be negotiated promptly and implemented over the next decade.***

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## **ANALYSIS, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM**

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) analysis, research, development, and demonstration (ARD&D) program should support the technology path leading to the global growth scenario and include diverse activities that balance risk and time scales, in pursuit of the strategic objective of preserving the nuclear option. *For technical, economic, safety, and public acceptance reasons, the highest priority in fuel cycle ARD&D, deserving first call on available funds, lies with efforts that enable robust deployment of the once-through fuel cycle.* The current DOE program does not have this focus.

Every industry in the United States develops basic analytical models and tools such as spreadsheets that allow firms, investors, policy makers, and regulators to understand how changes in the parameters of a process will affect the performance and cost of that process. But we have been struck throughout our study by the absence of such models and simulation tools that permit in-depth, quantitative analysis of trade-offs between different reactor and fuel

cycle choices, with respect to all key criteria. The analysis we have seen is based on point designs and does not incorporate information about the cost and performance of operating commercial nuclear facilities. Such modeling and analysis under a wide variety of scenarios, for both open and closed fuel cycles, will be useful to the industry and investors, as well as to international discussions about the desirability about different fuel cycle paths.

*We call on the Department of Energy, perhaps in collaboration with other countries, to establish a major project for the modeling, analysis, and simulation of commercial nuclear power systems — The Nuclear System Modeling Project.*

*For technical, economic, safety, and public acceptance reasons, the highest priority in fuel cycle R&D, deserving first call on available funds, lies with efforts that enable robust deployment of the once-through fuel cycle.*

This project should provide a foundation for the accumulation of information about how variations in the operation of plants and other parts of the fuel cycle affect costs, safety, waste, and proliferation resistance characteristics. The models and analysis should be based on real engineering data and, wherever possible, practical experience. This project is technically demanding and will require many years and considerable resources to be carried out successfully.

We believe that development of advanced nuclear technologies — either fast reactors or advanced fuel cycles employing reprocessing — should await the results of the *Nuclear System Modeling Project* we have proposed above. Our analysis makes clear that there is ample time for the project to compile the necessary engineering and economic analyses and data before undertaking expensive development programs, even if the project should take a decade to complete. Expensive programs that plan for the development or deployment of commercial reprocessing based on any existing advanced fuel cycle technologies are simply not justified on the basis of cost, or the unproven safety, proliferation risk, and waste properties of a closed cycle compared to the once-through cycle. Reactor concept evaluation should be part of the Nuclear System Modeling Project.

On the other hand, we support a modest laboratory scale research and analysis program on *new* separation methods and associated fuel forms, with the objective of learning about approaches that emphasize lower cost and more proliferation resistance. These data can be important inputs to advanced fuel cycle analysis and simulation and thus help prioritize future development programs.

The modeling project's research and analysis effort should only encompass technology pathways that do not produce weapons-usable material during normal operation (for example, by leaving some uranium, fission products,



and/or minor actinides with the recycled plutonium). *The closed fuel cycle currently practiced in Western Europe and Japan, known as PUREX/MOX, does not meet this criterion.* There are advanced closed fuel cycle concepts involving combinations of reactor, fuel form, and separations technology that satisfy these conditions and, with appropriate institutional arrangements, can have significantly better proliferation resistance than the PUREX/MOX fuel cycle, and perhaps approach that of the open fuel cycle. Accordingly, the governments of nuclear supplier countries should discourage other nations from developing and deploying the PUREX/MOX fuel cycle.

Government R&D support for advanced design LWRs and for the High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) is justified because these are the two reactor types that are most likely to play a role in any nuclear expansion. R&D support for advanced design LWRs should focus on measures that reduce construction and operating cost. Because the High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR) has potential advantages with respect to safety, proliferation resistance, modularity and efficiency, government research and limited development support to resolve key uncertainties, for example, the performance of HTGR fuel forms in reactors and gas power conversion cycle components, is warranted.

Waste management also calls for a significant, and redirected, ARD&D program. The DOE waste program, understandably, has been singularly focused for the past several years on the Yucca Mountain project. We believe DOE must broaden its waste R&D effort or run the risk of being unable to rigorously defend its choices for waste disposal sites. More attention needs to be given to the characterization of waste forms and engineered barriers, followed by development and testing of engineered barrier systems. We believe deep boreholes, as an alternative to mined repositories, should be aggressively pursued. These issues are inherently of international interest in the growth scenario and should be pursued in such a context.

*The closed fuel cycle currently practiced in Western Europe and Japan, known as PUREX/MOX, does not meet this nonproliferation criterion.*

There is opportunity for international cooperation in this ARD&D program on safety, waste, and the Nuclear System Modeling Project. A particularly pertinent effort is the development, deployment, and operation of a world wide materials protection, control, and accounting tracking system. There is no currently suitable international organization for this development task. A possible approach lies with the G-8 as a guiding body.

Our global growth scenario envisions an open fuel cycle architecture at least until mid-century or so, with the advanced closed fuel cycles possibly deployed later, but only if significant improvements are realized through

research. The principal driver of this conclusion is our judgment that natural uranium ore is available at reasonable prices to support the open cycle at least to late in the century in a scenario of substantial expansion. This gives the open cycle clear economic advantage with proliferation resistance an important additional feature. The DOE should undertake a global uranium resource evaluation program to determine with greater confidence the uranium resource base around the world.

Accordingly, we recommend:

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***The U.S. Department of Energy should focus its R&D program on the once-through fuel cycle;***

***The U.S. Department of Energy should establish a Nuclear System Modeling project to carry out the analysis, research, simulation, and collection of engineering data needed to evaluate all fuel cycles from the viewpoint of cost, safety, waste management, and proliferation resistance;***

***The U.S. Department of Energy should undertake an international uranium resource evaluation program;***

***The U.S. Department of Energy should broaden its waste management R&D program;***

***The U.S. Department of Energy should support R&D that reduces Light Water Reactor (LWR) costs and for development of the HTGR for electricity application.***

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We believe that the ARD&D program proposed here is aligned with the strategic objective of enabling a credible growth scenario over the next several decades. Such a ARD&D program requires incremental budgets of almost \$400 million per year over the next 5 years, and at least \$460 million per year for the 5-10 year period.